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THE DEMISE OF OFFICER INVOLVEMENT IN SOLDIERS' SPORT DURING 
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
by 
Lawrence W.Fielding  
William T. Weinberg 
Brenda G. Pitts  
Richard A. Fee 
University of Louisville 
During the American Civil War a few officers in the Army of 
the Potomac became involved in organizing sport for 
soldiers.1  They had ulterior motives. In each instance 
officers intended to use sport to improve soldier morale, 
assuage despondency and doubt, and to overcome homesickness.2 
Officers chose sport because they believed that sport 
entertainment had the capacity to create excitement, 
excitement that drew men's minds off immediate problems and 
left a generalized "good feeling"3 among the men. Once 
officers had assigned a use value to sport, they began to 
consider ways to maximize sport's usefulness as a morale 
booster.  To this end officers attempted to organize sport 
to produce the greatest entertainment for the greatest 
number.4 Their experiment, begun in the fall of 1861, 
continued periodically during 1862, and reached major 
proportions during the winter camp at Falmouth, Virginia in 
1863.  Between January 1, 1863 and April 18, 1863 officers 
produced six major sport festivals.5  Each festival drew 
between ten and twenty thousand soldiers.  After Falmouth the 
experiment ended abruptly. 
Officers organized in specific ways for specific 
reasons.  Their plans and administrative efforts derived 
from notions about the rank and file as spectators and as 
participants. These notions were clearly wrong. Beneath the 
obvious problems of organization and administration that were 
created by officers incomplete understanding about the 
soldier community's demand for sport involvement lay a deeper 
misunderstanding. Officers assumed that the rank file would 
willingly abdicate positions as organizers (producers), 
allowing officers to formally subjugate leisure actions for 
productive reasons. This assumption was not entirely wrong.  
Initially, officers did formally subsume soldier's sport 
making it an abstract and a concrete tool to meet morale and 
entertainment needs. The problem was that a certain section 
within the soldier society would not relinquish control over 
their sport unless their personal demands for active 
participation were met.  When officers made organizational and 
administrative mistakes that prevented maximum participation, 
soldier organizers wrestled control away from the original 
planners, restructuring organization to meet their own needs.  
The transfer of control did not always occur smoothly; 
sometimes officers fought back. At these times the 
disruptions, the injuries, the loss of control alarmed 
officers.  In the end officers concluded that it was best to 
let soldiers organize their own fun. 
Typically, soldiers organized and administered their 
own sport.6 Officers merely watched.  Even massed sport, the 
periodic snowball battles, rabbit chases, and horse races 
that drew large crowds of participants and occasionally of 
spectators as well, originated within the soldier 
community.7 An informative general example of this process, 
what caused it, and how it worked was the Christmas Day 
footrace held at Falmouth in 1862 that made Riley Tanner a 
celebrity. 
Riley Tanner represents a particular class of 
soldiers, men not opposed to officer involvement in the 
organization of sport, but men who demanded the opportunity 
to participate as often and as long as they desired. Tanner 
was city bred; he grew up in Scranton, Pennsylvania.  After 
a minimum commitment to public school education, he 
graduated into the work force relatively early in life. 
When the war broke out in 1861, Tanner had been in the 
labor force nearly a decade, six of those years as a 
railroad mechanic; he had a steady job and family 
responsibilities. Although the war for the union was 
important, it was at first remote.  Tanner did not enlist 
immediately because he had other pressing responsibilities.8 
In August of 1862 when Robert E. Lee and the Confederate 
Army threatened to invade the North, Tanner enlisted. Two 
weeks later, a member of the "Railroad Guards," Company 
"I," 132nd Pennsylvania, he marched to Antietam Creek. 
The 132nd Pennsylvania became part of the veteran Gibralter 
Brigade.  The veterans greeted the new unit reservedly, 
acceptance required the test of battle. At Antietam, along 
the Sunken Road near the Roulette Farm House, Riley Tanner, 
age 24, and the railroad workers fought their first 
battle.9  Their test of courage, bravely begun, ended in 
embarrassment when a Confederate cannon shell leveled a 
long row of bee hives near where the soldiers waited to 
fight. The men ran in all directions, chased by angry 
bees, brigade and regimental officers powerless to stop the 
rout.lO Three months later, at Fredericksburg, they redeemed 
themselves, marching in closed ranks up the hill towards the 
Stone Wall, where Confederates, lined four and five deep and 
flanked by massed cannon, waited to open fire.11 Twelve 
days later the survivors celebrated Christmas. 
Christmas Day had its drawbacks but ended in 
excitement. The men of the l32nd, experiencing their first 
Christmas away from home and families, within sight of a 
battlefield that could only be described as a devastating 
Union loss, had little to celebrate.  Dinner consisted of 
boiled rice and molasses, hardtack, and stewed dried ap 
les.l2 A whiskey ration, a gill per man, did little to 
brighten enthusiasm.13 In the afternoon the men organized 
a footrace with the neighboring 4th New York.  A group of 
Pennsylvania soldiers had been roaming around in the morning 
looking for something to do. They stumbled across a group 
of soldiers in the 4th New York practicing their 
sprinting. Unimpressed, the Pennsylvanians chanted, "He 
is not much of a runner."14 Challenge followed immediately.  
The Pennsylvanians hurried back to camp to spread the news 
of the challenge.  Large numbers of soldiers got involved 
spreading news, joining and conducting sprint trials.l5 
Riley Tanner emerged as champion.  The commotion caused by 
the challenge and the speed trials alerted men from other 
units. Nearly the whole division gathered, lining both 
sides of the track with a solid wall of men.l6 Tanner, 
"running like a frightened deer," beat the 4th New York's 
champion by a dozen feet. A furor followed.  The 
Pennsylvanians, hailing Tanner as hero, carried him 
triumphantly through all the company streets, shouting and 
bragging as Christmas ended in excitement.l7 
There are elements in the above example that provide 
insights into both the success and the failure of officer 
involvement in organized sport. First, the footrace derived 
from an impromptu challenge. A group of soldiers looking 
for action found another group of soldiers at play.  They 
devised a means of getting in on the fun. Second, the 
challenge led to a spree of hastily organized sprint trials 
that allowed everyone who cared a chance to participate as 
much as they wanted.  Even if defeated a solder could run 
again. He might not be declared champion, but he could 
continue to race, searching for someone he could beat. 
Beyond this, soldiers could and did participate as news 
spreaders, sprint trial consultants and judges, braggers, 
and opinion setters, and each felt some degree of 
importance, a part of the event with a stake in the 
outcome. Third, in lieu of a central organization 
controlling the search for a champion, soldiers 
administered several separate organized sprint trials. 
These small pockets of organization permitted maximum 
participation for both sprinters and administrators. 
Finally, officer observers, although aware of the sprint 
trial process, did not observe the actual administration 
of the speed trials.  Instead, they witnessed the final 
race between Tanner and the 4th New York champion.  They 
did not distinguish between spectator and participant; 
rather, they concluded that the soldiers enjoyed 
themselves, that the excitement took men's minds off 
immediate problems, and that sport improved morale whether 
soldiers played or watched. Officers realized that the 
quest for champion had been inefficiently administered. 
This realization was perceptive. Indeed, it is possible 
that Riley Tanner may not have been the fastest runner in 
the l32nd Pennsylvania. His emergence as sprint trial 
winner could merely have been a consequence of his desire 
to continue racing even when defeated. Put another way, 
Tanner won because he gradually wore down the opposition.  
Officers aware of such possibilities concentrated on 
streamlining the sprint trial process, assuming that 
soldier organized trials were inefficient because soldiers 
did not know how to organize effectively. Consequently, 
when officers organized sport for soldiers, they focused 
on administrative efficiency and chose sports that large 
numbers could watch. Early efforts centered around 
Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays and were regimental 
affairs.  The 1861 Christmas Day celebration organized by 
Colonel Edward Cross for the 5th New Hampshire was typical. 
Cross's original intent was merely to provide some 
excitement for his soldiers on Christmas morning, leaving 
them free to do as they pleased for the rest of the day.18 
Although a stern disciplinarian, a man noted for his hot 
temper when breaches of military conduct occurred, Cross 
empathized with his men.l9 The 5th New Hampshire's ranks 
were dominated by mechanics and small farmers, men with 
little or no public education, men like Riley Tanner who 
joined the work force relatively early in life. Most of 
them were family men, and typically they left good jobs and 
families behind when they enlisted.  The average age in 
the regiment was twenty-six. 20 They joined the war only 
when Bull Run convinced them that victory demanded their 
personal attention. Cross realized that for such men 
holidays were difficult times breeding thoughts of home 
and loved ones. To assuage homesickness and despondency, 
he purchased a pig to be let loose at ten o'clock Christmas 
morning.21 Regimental officers convinced Cross to expand the 
format to include more activities. Cross added a five 
hundred yard footrace with the best two of three heats to 
decide the winner, a wrestling match, and a jumping 
contest. For each athletic contest Cross awarded cash 
prizes for first and second place finishers. The greased 
pig chase continued as the final activity. Cross planned 
the whole affair to be finished before noon.22 
Nothing went as Cross planned.  The footraces consumed 
almost three hours. The wrestling match did not finish 
until nearly three o'clock.  The greased pig chase, the 
intended climax of the day, had to be switched from last to 
third event. The porker was captured much sooner than 
anticipated. The jumping contest, the new last event, was 
anticlimatic. Like the other athletic events, the jumping 
contest took more time than Cross had planned; it ended 
after dark.23 
Colonel Cross's inability to administer sport 
effectively within a given time frame derived from two 
specific though interrelated causes.  First, numbers 
created the problems that frustrated Cross's attempt to 
organize soldier's sport. There were too many people who 
wanted to run, or to wrestle or to jump, or to chase the 
greased pig.  Conventional wisdom neither predicted such an 
occurrence nor provided insights into how to deal with it. 
The greased pig chase is a case in point.  Cross planned to 
conduct the chase inside a hollow square formed by the 
soldiers of the regiment.24 This was not a bad idea. If 
the soldiers maintained their positions, the pig would be 
unable to break completely free. It would be forced to run 
around inside the square and would eventually tire, making 
it an easy target for the chasers. The problem with this 
arrangement was that Cross did not designate which soldiers 
would be allowed to do the chasing.  Instead of a few 
soldiers rushing after the pig, it appears that the hollow 
square collapsed around the animal. Soldiers from all sides 
made a mad dash for the prey. Forty year old private 
Patrick Rowen reached the pig first.25 His hold on the 
porker was broken by soldiers charging from different 
directions. Despite collisions and grease, the soldier mob 
caught the pig, knocking him off his feet and falling on 
him, the sure weight of numbers preventing further 
struggle.26 The administration of the greased pig chase 
reflected the same fundamental organizational problems that 
plagued the footrace, the wrestling match and the jumping 
contest. There was too little planning for too many 
soldiers. 
The failure to anticipate the number of probable 
participants resulted in a second problem. Cross lost 
direct control over the sporting event and the actions of 
soldier players. Once an event got started, there was no 
good way of stopping it. The wrestling match is an 
excellent example. Cross had no idea about the actual number 
of soldiers desiring to wrestle. He apparently thought that 
most soldiers would rather watch. Consequently, he gave no 
thought or consideration to how he would handle wrestle-
offs. Self-declared winners simply proceeded to wrestle 
other self-declared winners until everyone had had enough 
activity, and there were only two men left.27 Cross lost 
control, in part, because he had not planned effectively for 
the numbers he had to deal with.  There was another reason. 
When Cross's plans proved ineffective, the soldiers took 
over, administering the fun in much the same way that 
soldiers in the 132nd Pennsylvania organized the speed 
trials that led to the emergence of Riley Tanner as champ.  
Hence, poor planning and large numbers conspired, forcing an 
administrative breakdown; in an attempt to save the fun 
soldiers resorted to less centralized methods of 
administration, forcing Cross to relinquish his jurisdiction 
over sport. 
There were obvious lessons to be gleaned from Cross's 
attempt to organize and control sport for the soldier 
community, but officers understood these lessons in 
incomplete ways. For example, officers learned from 
experiments like Cross's that better organization was 
essential. The problem was the officers linked 
organization to spectators not participants.28 Even when the 
end result, improved morale, appeared to be successful, 
officers misunderstood the cause. Soldiers at sport 
appeared to be having a good time. Cross and other officers 
linked this appearance to a general good feeling among the 
men, concluding that sport was a viable alternative to 
common morale problems such as despondency and doubt.29 This 
conclusion by itself was not bad. However, Cross did not 
comprehend that the good feelings derived from active 
participation.30 Soldiers watching the activity wanted to 
join; they wanted to feel good too.  Officers aware of the 
use value of sport as morale booster desired to maximize 
sport's effects, but they concluded that these effects 
accrued equally to spectators and participants. Instead of 
planning to allow maximum participation for the greatest 
number of soldiers, officers concentrated on ways of 
producing excitement for large numbers of spectators. Even 
elaborate planners like J.H. Hobart Ward and Thomas Francis 
Meagher failed to understand that maximum participation 
predicated intelligent organization. 
The 1863 New Year's Day sport festival, planned by J.H. 
Hobart Ward and his staff, paid close attention to spectator 
enjoyment.31 The entertainment included a wide menu of events 
designated to specific time blocks and organized for special 
areas to insure maximum viewing pleasure. Soldiers cleared a 
large, relatively flat area in front of division 
headquarters on which they built a primitive stadium. In 
front of the stadium they constructed a racetrack with 
hurdle and flat jumps.  Inside the race track they 
established areas for mule races, footraces, feats of 
strength and agility, boxing and wrestling matches, 
burlesque cockfights and set up a wheel of fortune and a 
greased pole climb. Space for each of these events was 
necessarily restricted, but each designated area could be 
easily viewed from the grandstands. 32 To make events 
progress efficiently, Ward assigned officers to administer 
each event.  The 38th New York was given the task of 
welcoming and seating guests and for providing overall crowd 
control.33 Invitations were sent to the different units in 
the division as well as to other units encamped in the 
vicinity, "To attend the entertainment.34 Prize money was 
raised among the officers of the division and a one o clock 
starting time was set for the commencement of the 
activities.35 Ward and his staff excelled at arrangements 
for spectator pleasure and convenience. 
Time and space, the two variables that Ward manipulated 
in favor of anticipated large crowds of watchers, conspired 
to cause problems when enthusiastic participants arrived on 
the scene.  The one o' clock starting time meant in effect 
that there would be only four or at most five hours of 
actual play time before darkness made watching difficult.  
This restriction, requiring several events to be run at the 
same time, was further complicated by limited space and the 
belief that certain events, because of their spectator 
appeal, ought to be run separately. Hence, Ward was 
required to sequence events on the basis of time, space, 
and anticipated spectator interest and to do so with a 
tangible efficiency that kept everything moving. The first 
event, the hurdle race, came off smoothly, but the races 
that followed were interrupted by spectators pushing onto 
the track in an attempt to join the fun.36 Exactly what fun 
the soldiers were trying to join is unclear.  They may have 
desired to actually participate in the horse races. They may 
have misunderstood the overall plan for the day. Fearing 
that they would miss the opportunity to play, they pushed 
onto the track to get to the wheel of fortune, the greased 
pole climb, and to see what was going on in the infield. 
In any event, their forced entrance onto the track and into 
the infield quickly filled all available space, disrupted 
organization, and threatened carefully planned sequences.37 
Despite intricate planning, Ward's efforts to host the 
New Year's Day sport festival failed. Even though the 
activities that Ward and his staff planned did in fact run, 
each had complications.  The number of aspiring participants 
and the lack of foresight about soldier demand for active 
involvement caused the problems. The sport festival 
attracted between ten and twenty thousand soldiers.38 The 
centralized infield was not designed for anywhere near that 
many participants. It would have been better to have spread 
things out to allow greater play space. The events Ward 
planned were not designed to accommodate enthusiastic 
players but to entertain spectators. The wheel of fortune, 
for example, permitted only one soldier to participate at a 
time but allowed many to watch and to be amused by the 
ludicrous failures of others.39 Organizers made no attempt 
to limit or control the number of participants. Only for 
the footraces did they announce any restrictions on who 
could play; the footraces were closed to men in the 
Pennsylvania Reserve.40 When massive numbers of soldiers 
demanded access to the ranks of participation, planning 
suffered and organization disintegrated.  The race track 
and the infield became a milling mass of men interested in 
performing not watching. The officers of Ward's staff 
assigned to run the events did in fact adjust. When the 
time designated for their particular event was up, they 
stopped and left the field.41 When this happened, the 
soldier community took over and ran the event as they 
pleased.  This disrupted the administration of events that 
were supposed to follow.  Consequently, organization and 
administration continued to deteriorate. Before the day was 
over soldiers had succeeded, once again, in wresting the 
control of sport away from the original planners. 
In Cross's and Ward's attempts to organize sport for 
soldiers a general trend emerges. Both officers intended to 
use sport to improve soldier morale.  When they organized 
sport, they took control away from the soldier community, a 
community used to planning and administering its own fun. 
Both Cross and Ward took control because they wanted to 
maximize sport's use value.42 Through proper organization 
and efficient administration, they believed that they could 
extend the entertainment power of sport to greater numbers 
of soldiers.  Initially, the soldier community acquiesced, 
permitting the takeover of their leisure by officers.  
However, when officer planning and administration failed 
to accommodate solider interest in participation, the 
soldier community first disrupted administrative efforts 
and then gradually took over the control of sport. In 
the above examples neither Cross or Ward attempted to 
prevent or even contest the takeover. They simply 
relinquished the field to the common soldier.43 Thomas 
Francis Meagher and the staff officers of the Irish 
Brigade did not give up control so easily. 
The planning and organization that preceded 
Meagher's St.Patrick's Day celebration of 1863 
accentuated the errors that Cross and Ward made earlier. 
Nearly every minute of the entire day was planned.44 
Committees were assigned to organize every detail. The 
day was to begin with a Mass at 8:00 a.m.for which the 
brigade built a chapel. A steeplechase track, two and 
one-half miles long, was constructed with hurdles and 
ditched fences. The track crossed two natural rivers 
which brigade engineers reconstructed, making them 
uniformly thirty feet wide and between four and six feet 
deep. Along the course judges' stands and a clerk of 
the course stand were built. A large grandstand was 
erected at the finish line. The horse races were to 
begin at eleven o'clock, followed by a special luncheon 
at one o'clock. In the afternoon sports for 
noncommissioned officers and privates were planned.45 
Meagher organized footraces, weight casting contests, a 
soaped pig chase, hurdle races, a wheelbarrow race, 
sack races, and an Irish dance contest. The evening was 
to be devoted to theatrical entertainments including 
recitations, songs, and toasts.46 Meagher and his 
committees, aware of the time and space problems caused 
by so many events, planned to control participation by 
limiting the number of players in specific events.47 To 
accomplish this end they expediently assigned certain 
soldiers to act as participants,48 believing somehow 
that other soldiers would understand that they were not 
to participate and would therefore be content merely to 
watch. Meagher and his staff apparently never 
considered what the soldier community might do when they 
saw the fun and were informed that they were not to be 
included beyond the act of watching. 
Although the day began smoothly, it ended 
turbulently and abruptly. The first sport event, the 
Grand Steeplechase, open only to officers in the Irish 
Brigade, came off very well. The trouble began during 
the second steeplechase, the "Race for All Comers."49 The 
race was designed to allow officers in other units the 
opportunity to compete in a steeplechase.50 A race for all 
comers meant to the rank and file that anyone who wanted 
to race would be given the opportunity to indulge their 
desires. Consequently, some soldiers tried to join the 
race.51 Fortunately for the organizers the race began 
before the would-be participants could secure their 
mounts.52 It was also fortunate that the organizers had 
planned for the winner to be declared after only one 
heat. At one o'clock Meagher announced that there would 
be a short intermission before the afternoon sports 
began. Thinking that everything was running smoothly, 
Meagher and his staff adjourned to the luncheon feast 
with their special guests.53 
Attempting to adjourn so large a crowd before it 
had the opportunity to do anything was not one of 
Meagher's better ideas. When Meagher and his staff 
vacated the racing field, the private soldier took 
control. Horses of every shape and description entered the 
field, ridden by all manner of horsemen.54 The race track 
became a mass of men and horses, racing everywhere and in 
every direction, without regard for life or limb. This 
continued, despite injury and death, until Meagher and his 
staff returned and attempted to regain control of the sport 
events.  By this time things had gone too far. The soldier 
community was unwilling to submit again to officer control. 
The soldier organized horse races continued despite the fact 
that officers began to administer other events in the same 
areas.55 Indeed, many soldiers viewed the planned for events 
as mere sideshows to their own horse races.56 Just as the 
last footrace began a fight broke out among the men. Joseph 
Hooker, commander of the Army of the Potomac, whether 
perturbed or frightened, decided that the only way to 
regain control of the situation was to send the soldiers 
back to their respective units.57 Hooker's orders brought 
the athletic events to an abrupt halt. 
Meagher's elaborate plans, like the plans of Ward and 
Cross before him, were thwarted by rambunctious soldiers 
bent on joining the fun. To his credit, Meagher realized 
the need to limit participation. However, Meagher, his 
staff, and his committees had not developed an effective 
plan to limit participation. Instead of spending all his 
time building facilities, Meagher would have been better off 
devoting that time to conducting trial heats and elimination 
contests to cut down the size of the field of active 
participants. This process could have effectively included 
soldiers as organizers and administrators in much the same 
way that the 132nd Pennsylvania did when choosing a sprint 
champion.  This idea did not occur to Meagher. His actions 
were expedient.  He apparently did not consider what might 
happen when soldiers discovered that they would not be 
allowed to participate. The idea of telling twenty thousand 
soldiers to wait while he and his staff had lunch informs 
about Meagher's basic misconceptions regarding the soldier 
community, its thirst for active participation and what it 
was likely to do when officer organizers prevented fun. 
Thomas Livermore, an officer in the 18th New 
Hampshire, could have told Meagher what would happen.  In 
1861 Livermore had been a noncommissioned officer in the 5th 
New Hampshire.58 He had been a part of the Christmas Day 
celebration that Colonel Cross had planned.59 He knew how 
the soldier community would react when official plans for 
sport went awry.  Livermore observed the Irish Brigade's 
celebration on St. Patrick's Day, 1863. A devoted adherent 
of horse racing, Livermore had been disappointed when he 
couldn't enter "the race for all comers" because his horse, 
borrowed from Adjutant Dodd, arrived late.  Later, Livermore 
decided that he had been fortunate: "I might have been 
brought off the field with a broken collar bone, or worse, 
had it not been that Dodd failed to reach the field in time 
with his horse."60  After the first race had been completed, 
foot soldiers took control of the track, sponsoring 
additional races without the advantage of rules or common 
sense.61 There were thousands on the field. Everyone who 
cared to play mustered a horse and joined the fun. The 
track, already muddy from the first race, became a slippery 
quagmire. The racing continued, unrestrained by any power, 
until two horsemen, charging in opposite directions, 
collided. Both men were killed as were both horses.62 The 
enlisted men, enthusiastic, eager to join the fun, took 
control of the horse races when Meagher and his staff 
relinquished the field. The lack of centralized control 
made the horse race a free-for-all, a place unfit for man 
or beast.  The footraces that followed, Meagher's bid to 
regain control, ended prematurely because the common 
soldiers would not relinquish the control of sport a second 
time without a fight. 
Livermore's observations provide three important 
insights into the problems officers experienced when they 
tried to take control of soldier sport.63 First, 
Livermore's description of the St. Patrick's Day 
celebration provides insight into the process of the 
soldier takeover.  As Livermore watched the gradual 
disintegration of officer control, other observers watched 
with him. Not everyone pushed onto the field to 
participate. Sport enthusiasts took control. Furthermore, 
they took control gradually by creating small pockets of 
organization. This was why there were so many horse races 
in different directions at different distances. This was 
why the track appeared to be a milling mass of humanity 
and horseflesh.  As the small pockets of organization 
broadened, drawing larger and larger numbers into the role 
of active participant, all semblance of official control 
disappeared. Meagher may not have been able to regain 
control simply because by the time he returned to the field 
there were too many organizers already operating to permit 
a return to a single centralized administration. 
Second, Livermore provides important clues about who 
the sport enthusiasts that took control of sport actually 
were. Livermore's experience with the 5th New Hampshire 
provided important insights. The soldier takeover of St. 
Patrick's Day sport was more than merely a response to poor 
planning and organization. When Cross's organization of 
the Christmas Day celebration proved faulty, soldiers took 
over because men, like Riley Tanner, were used to 
organizing and administering their own fun. They 
acquiesced to official involvement in sport administration 
only to the extent that officers planned effectively. When 
demands for participation were not met, soldiers took 
control and administered sport for maximum play time and 
enjoyment.  Tanner and the soldiers in the 5th New 
Hampshire shared similar backgrounds.  Most of them entered 
the work force relatively early in life by necessity. They 
were men short on formal education and long on work 
experience. They had steady jobs before the war, usually 
as skilled workers. They enlisted late because they had 
more pressing responsibilities at home. In general, they 
were men who had experienced a modicum of success in life 
as a result of their own drive and initiative.  They were 
used to taking work related orders from bosses or 
employers.  The notion that officers could or should take 
control of soldiers' leisure activities, even if such a 
development was in the soldiers' best interest, had not 
occurred to them. When it happened, they waited to see if 
their desire for fun was met. When it wasn't, they took 
control. 
Finally, Livermore provides insights into the 
probable reasons officers declined to get involved in 
organizing sport for soldiers after Falmouth. Despite the 
disruptions, the loss of control, the injuries and the 
deaths that attended the occurrence of the sport festivals, 
officers still believed that sport could be used to 
improve morale.64  However, the problems officers 
experienced in organizing sport for their charges had 
important consequences. In general, officers concluded 
that the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. 
Officers like Livermore believed that organizing 
sport for soldiers was not necessary. The men who 
disrupted sport, men who caused the problems, were 
the active participants. They were the soldiers 
who derived the greatest benefit from sport.They 
were the participants who became so engrossed in 
activity that they forgot immediate problems. This 
becoming engrossed was also part of the problem. 
When restrictions were placed in the way of their 
fun, these enthusiastic participants responded by 
organizing and administering sport on their own 
irrespective of official plans. The spectators who 
with Livermore continued to watch were not 
actively involved and therefore derived less 
benefit from sport festival. More importantly, the 
soldiers who did get involved, the ones who 
disrupted because they desired activity, were the 
ones who would have organized sport for themselves 
if officers had not bothered.65 Hence, officer 
involvement in sport only created problems,66 
problems that could easily be avoided by simply 
letting the soldier community organize and 
administer its own leisure, just as it had always 
done. 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1. Relatively few officers organized sport 
for soldiers. Volunteer officers in the 2nd and 
3rd Corps of the Union Army headed the of 
principal organizers. There are no general 
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